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Abstract
We present a simple model in which rational but uninformed traders occasionally
chase noise as if it were information, thereby amplifying sentiment shocks and
moving prices away from fundamental values. In the model, noise traders can have
an impact on market equilibrium disproportionate to their size in the market. The
model oers a partial explanation for the surprisingly low market price of nancial
risk in the spring of 2007.
1. Introduction
In the spring of 2007, nancial markets, and in particular markets for
xed income securities, were extraordinarily calm. Corporate bond spreads
were remarkably low, as were the prices of credit default swaps (CDS) on
nancial rms (see Fig. 1 below). This tranquility ended in the summer of
2007, as the problems with subprime mortgages precipitated a sequence of
events leading to a major nancial crisis. The price of risk eventually rose to
the highest level in decades.
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1It is obvious from the tranquility in the spring of 2007 that nancial
markets, and in particular, derivative markets, did not anticipate the crisis.
What makes this fact particularly interesting is that most of the participants
in these markets are sophisticated investors. Unlike, say, in the Internet
bubble, this pricing was unlikely to be driven by the mass of demand by
unsophisticated investors. Could the observed tranquility of markets in the
spring of 2007 have resulted from the trading behavior of sophisticated in-
vestors that masked the potential bad news? In this paper, we suggest that
the answer is yes. We propose a very simple model, extending Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980), which focuses on the interaction of dierent types of in-
vestors in a market, the vast majority of whom are rational, and shows how
this interaction can sustain incorrect prices.
The basic idea is to consider three types of investors: a small number of
investors, called Insiders, who possess valuable information and trade com-
pletely rationally, a small number of Noise traders who are vulnerable to
sentiment shocks and trade on those, and the vast majority of Outsiders,
who possess no information but learn from prices and trade rationally. All
the Insiders have the same information, and all the Noise traders face the
same sentiment shock. The focus of the paper is the trading by the silent
majority of Outsiders, and its eect on prices.
The problem facing an Outsider is dicult. On the one hand, he wants to
follow the Insiders who know something, but since he only observes prices,
would like to chase price increases caused by Insiders trading on valuable
information. On the other hand, he wants to bet against the Noise traders
who are inuenced by sentiment, but again since he only observes prices,
would like to sell into a rising market and be a contrarian. Which one of
these motives dominates? In particular, is it possible for this rational Out-
sider to get confused and to chase noise as if it were information? We show
that in markets with suciently few Noise traders, the answer is yes, and
Outsiders occasionally end up chasing sentiment, thereby suppressing the
possible impact of informed trading on prices. They do so because, in those
circumstances, they believe that price movements reect information even
though they reect noise.
The composition of a market can be depicted graphically on a triangle, as
in Fig. 2. The x-axis represents the proportion of market participants who
are Insiders, denoted by I, and the y-axis represents the proportion who are
Noise traders, denoted by N. The remaining proportion is Outsiders, denoted
by O, so that the three shares sum to one. Both Insiders and Outsiders are
2Fig. 1: Credit default swap (CDS) spreads 1/1/07-12/31/07. These are
constructed as a weighted average of CDS spreads for individual rms in the
Banking and Financial services sectors.
sophisticated, but the former are better informed. In the markets of interest,
we think of most traders as Outsiders: rational and sophisticated, but not
well-informed. This corresponds to points near the origin in this triangle,
labeled \Region of interest."
We can think of the evidence in Fig. 1 as an outcome in a market in our
Region of interest. Specically, the corporate bond and CDS markets are
dominated by Outsiders, with small but positive masses of Noise traders and
informed traders. In the spring of 2007, the Noise traders were very calm
(and hence very willing to sell insurance), and the majority of sophisticated
but uninformed investors took the low price of risk as evidence that the world
3Fig. 2: Market composition. The masses of Insiders, Noise traders, and
Outsiders sum to one. The Region of interest is the area near the origin but
o the axes.
was indeed safe. As a consequence, they were also willing to sell insurance.
Even if there were informed investors in this market who saw the risk of a
calamity and were buying insurance, their demand was constrained by their
risk-bearing capacity (Lewis, 2010). This demand was then insucient to
raise the price of risk signicantly because the Outsiders owned most capital
and believed that the low price of risk reected good news. Starting in the
summer of 2007, public news about fundamentals revealed that the low price
of risk was not justied. Because risk was not correctly priced before, the
reaction of the price to news was substantial, as Fig. 1 shows.
We examine the responsiveness of prices to sentiment when almost all
investors are sophisticated. If S is the sentiment shock and p is the price of
the asset, our argument requires that
@p
@S be large. One might think that this
4will not be true in a market with only a few Noise traders, because such a
market will behave almost like a market with no Noise traders at all. We show
how this intuition can fail. Under plausible conditions,
@p
@S can be very large
in our Region of interest. This implies that the small mass of Noise traders
can have a disproportionately large impact on market prices. Even with
a modest Noise trader shock, prices can diverge sharply from fundamental
values in a market dominated by sophisticated traders.
This counterintuitive result holds because the Outsiders, in their attempt
to chase the Insiders, occasionally chase Noise traders instead. In markets
with a high enough average information-to-noise ratio, each Outsider's de-
mand curve is upward sloping. Since there is a large mass of these traders,
they exert strong pressure on prices in the direction where they observe
movement.
Without Noise traders, the fully revealing equilibrium of Grossman and
Stiglitz (1976) prevails. Outsiders observe the price and infer the predictable
component of the fundamental value: they fully trust the price. With the
rst marginal mass of Noise traders, prices still reect mainly information
and Outsiders still heavily rely on the price in their expectation formation.
Their expectations still move almost one-for-one with movements in prices
and thus almost one-for-one with noise. They trade on this information and
hence amplify price movements due to noise.1
We consider three metrics for stability2 and eciency of the market. The
rst is an ex-post measure of the responsiveness of price to the Noise trader
shock,
@p
@S. The second is an ex-ante measure of the variance of the price,
conditional on the Insider's information, V ar(pjInsideInformation). The
third is the informativeness of the pricing system, as dened by Grossman
and Stiglitz, corr(value;p). According to this last metric, additional Insiders
make the market more ecient, on average. However, we are especially
interested in the rst two metrics, because they speak to the question of how
markets can deviate from eciency even when most traders are sophisticated
and Noise trader shocks are modest. We consider these metrics separately
to distinguish between ex-ante and ex-post stability.
If we see a single outcome in which the market price is apparently far away
from fundamental value{like credit default swaps in the spring of 2007{and
1We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this exposition.
2A stable market is not very responsive to noise and has low levels of noise-induced
variance.
5want to understand how and why this happened, it is helpful to know that
dp
dS is very large so a moderate sentiment shock could plausibly cause a sig-
nicant mispricing. We study
dp
dS to understand the magnitude of mispricing
in individual realizations of the model.
We are also interested in the long-run properties of market behavior. The
model is static, but we can think intuitively about market behavior over time
as many repeated outcomes from the model. For this, the important met-
rics are moments of the data: the informativeness of the pricing system,
V ar(p), or V ar(pjInsideInformation). High informativeness or low condi-
tional variance are indicative of a market that behaves well, on average, over
time.
The literature on trading in nancial markets between better-and less-
informed investors is huge, so we can only refer to some of the studies. Gross-
man and Stiglitz (1980) consider a model with only rational investors and
demonstrate that, when acquiring information is costly, there cannot be a
market equilibrium in which prices fully reect fundamental values. Because
we are interested in a dierent question than Grossman and Stiglitz, we do
not consider the aggregation of information from dierentially informed ra-
tional traders. Rather, we focus on the eorts of uninformed rational traders
to piggyback on the trading of the informed ones.
Kyle (1985) considers markets with informed investors and Noise traders,
but also an uninformed but rational investor who, in his case, is a market
maker. Kyle is interested in market microstructure, and hence focuses on the
behavior of a monopolistic risk-neutral market maker, a setting appropriate
for his objective. We in contrast are interested in the market interactions of
small competitive investors, and hence have a dierent model and dierent
results. Wang (1993) presents a dynamic trading model with dierentially
informed investors, and shows that less-informed investors can rationally be-
have like price chasers. His model incorporates eects similar to ours, but
does not focus on the extreme sensitivity of prices to noise in the Region of
interest. Kogan, Ross, Wang, and Westereld (2006) examine the connec-
tion between Noise traders' survival and their impact on market equilibrium.
They nd that the two are not as tightly linked as naive intuition would sug-
gest. As Noise trader wealth goes to zero over time, their price impact can
decline much more slowly. Their results are similar to ours in that they nd
Noise trader impact can be disproportionate to their wealth, although their
mechanism focuses on the type of trading irrational traders engage in, rather
6than interaction eects. Barlevy and Veronesi (2003) consider a model with
risk-neutral Outsiders trading with Noise traders and Insiders, optimally ex-
tracting information from the price of an asset. In their model, the Outsiders
have a non-monotonic demand curve, leading the relationship between price
and fundamentals to be S-shaped. This induces a discontinuity in price when
the fundamentals fall below a certain level, which Barlevy and Veronesi in-
terpret as a crash. Their mechanism is dierent from ours, but their market
structure is similar.
In Stein (1987), rational speculation can impose an externality on traders
trying to make inferences from prices, and consequently destabilize prices.
In Calvo (2002), rational uninformed investors optimally extract information
from prices aected by informed investors. Instead of being confounded by
the presence of Noise traders, the confound he considers is occasional liquidity
shocks to the informed traders forcing them to withdraw from the market.
The uninformed traders misinterpret this as a negative shock to fundamentals
and drive down prices.
Our paper is also related to the literature on noise trading. DeLong et
al. (1990a) model the interaction between rational speculators, who would
correspond to the Outsiders in our model, and Noise traders. With no In-
siders in that model, trading by speculators unambiguously stabilizes prices.
In DeLong et al. (1990b), arbitrageurs buy in anticipation of positive feed-
back trading by the Noise traders, and thus destabilize prices.3 Allen and
Gale (1992) present a model of stock price manipulation by a large investor,
who buys and thus stimulates demand by uninformed investors trying to in-
fer information from price movements. Rossi and Tinn (2010) use the Kyle
(1985) framework to model positive feedback trading by rational uninformed
investors trying to learn from prices. Their model has several periods and
a dierent setup than ours, but they are trying to get at some related ideas
on how uninformed but rational speculators balance their desires to follow
3We are assuming that all the traders are price-takers, but in the limiting case when
we are thinking of literal Insiders, it is worth thinking about the possibility of price-
manipulation. In the two-period model we consider, the Insiders problem turns into
roughly that faced by Kyle's (1985) Insider, so he trades less aggressively to make monopoly
prots. To get more intricate price-manipulation behavior, we would need a longer-horizon
dynamic model as in DeLong et al. (1990b). It is dicult to imagine equilibria in which In-
siders systematically manipulate prices to take advantage of the Outsiders upward-sloping
demand curve. In such a strategy prole, it will generally be optimal for the Outsider to
deviate to submit a downward-sloping demand curve.
7Insiders and to bet against Noise traders.
Stein (2009) considers arbitrageurs trading against a statistical regularity
(under-reaction) causing a new type of market ineciency in the process of
trading away prot opportunities on the old type. He shows that prices can
sometimes be further away from fundamental values than they are without
the arbitrageurs. In both his approach and ours, rational traders try to push
prices towards their rational expectation of fundamental value, but in our
approach the expectation of fundamental value derives from both a private
signal and observation of the price, whereas his traders observe the price and
a statistical regularity they can take advantage of.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we formally present
and solve the model. Section 3 examines the slope of an Outsider's demand
curve. Section 4 analyzes the implications of the demand curve for market
equilibrium. Section 5 considers measures of market stability and eciency
besides the sensitivity of market price to sentiment. Section 6 concludes. All
proofs and derivations are in the appendices.
2. The model
There is a market for a risky asset in supply 1 trading at price p. There
are two periods. Trading occurs in period 1, then the asset pays o its
fundamental value V in period 2.4 The fundamental value is the sum of
three terms. First is the unconditional expectation .5 Second is a shock
4We think of period 1 as a length of time over which all the agents trade anonymously
and repeatedly until the market settles into equilibrium. In any such situation, Insiders
and Noise traders will make initial trades. If their demand curves are upward sloping, the
Outsiders will trade in the direction of the subsequent price movements, and the sequential
behavior of trades may resemble that in a model of rational herding (see Bikhchandani et
al., 1992; Froot et al., 1992). We do not model these dynamic interactions.
5As Malcolm Baker pointed out, we could imagine a situation in which Outsiders have
more variables in their information set (such as ratings on structured nance), just fewer
than the Insiders. We could then write the value V as V = +0 +11 +22, where 0
is observable by all the agents. But this is equivalent to a renormalization of the constant
 to +0. Up to redenition, any other variables we include in the model which are
common knowledge become part of .
If instead, the signal 0 is observable only to the Insiders and the Outsiders, the equiv-
alence is more complicated because we need to add a conditional mean of  0 to the
Noise trader shock S. The results are essentially unchanged. We are therefore sweeping
under the rug the majority of the information available to the traders by putting it into
811 which is realized in period 1. 1 is Normally distributed with mean zero
and variance 1. Finally, there is a shock 22 to fundamental value which
is not realized until the second period. 2 is also distributed Normally with
mean zero and variance 1. The fundamental value is then given by
V =  + 11 + 22: (1)
In addition to this risky asset, there is a riskless asset in elastic supply
with return r.
There are three types of agents participating in this market: a mass N of
Noise traders, I of Insider/informed traders, and O of Outsiders/uninformed
sophisticated traders. We normalize I +O +N = 1. In period 1, the Insider
traders get a signal about the termination value of the asset. That is, each
Insider observes the same 1.
The Noise traders do not learn from prices and have a biased belief about
the fundamental value of the asset, given by a shock to their level of \senti-
ment," the random variable S.6 S is distributed normally with mean zero and
variance 2
S. Every Noise trader has the same realization S. S is independent
of all fundamentals.7
Outsiders are rational and optimally interpret the price signals they ob-
serve. All agents have constant absolute risk aversion utility with parameter
.
We begin by deriving the period-1 demand curves directly from utility
maximization. Each agent i begins with wealth Wi and chooses demand Di
to maximize
Ei[ e
 (DiV +(Wi Dip)r)].
the constant . Any information revelation or fundamental research that occurred before
period 1 is important economically, but does not bear on the interactions we consider.
6An alternative approach to modeling the idea that sophisticated traders react to noise
is dispersed information. In those models, strategic complementarities cause traders to
partially coordinate based on a noisy public signal such as a price, so noise in the public
signal can be substantially magnied as each trader reacts to the others' actions. See
Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006), Angeletos and Pavan (2007), Angeletos and La'o (2009),
and Hassan and Mertens (2010), among others. In particular, Mertens (2008) nds that
with dispersed information, small distortions in beliefs can render arbitrage infeasible.
7In the CDS market in 2007, we would argue that the price of risk diverged from
fundamentals, caused by a misperception about the riskiness of the underlying, which
implies a misperception about the expected return on the derivative.
9Maximizing this expression is equivalent to minimizing minus this expres-
sion, which is in turn equivalent to minimizing the log of that. Assuming for
the moment that V is normally distributed conditional on agent i's informa-
tion set, the rst-order condition immediately gives the demand curve:
Di =
Ei[V ]   pr
2
i(V )
; (2)
where Ei[] denotes the expectation with respect to agent i's information set
and 2
i(V ) denotes the variance of V conditional on agent i's information set.
For the Insider, this becomes
DI =
 + 11   pr
2
2
: (3)
For the Outsider, this becomes
DO =
 + E[11jp]   pr
2
O
; (4)
where E[11jp] and 2
O are endogenous. 2
O is given by

2
O = V ar(11jp) + 
2
2: (5)
Finally, the demand for the Noise traders is given by
DN =
 + S   pr
2
N
; (6)
where 2
N is the variance perceived by the Noise traders. Since the Noise
traders do not observe a signal or use the price to update their information
set, their perceived variance is the same8 as the ex-ante variance 2
N = (2
1 +
8In the model, we give each trader the same risk aversion and exogenously specify the
Noise trader's perceived variance as 2
1 + 2
2. We could imagine situations in which the
level of risk aversion varied across types or in which the Noise trader's incorrect beliefs
extended beyond the rst moment of the asset's value. Making these transformations
turns out to be equivalent to further altering the composition of the market.
Consider replacing the mass of the Outsiders (or Noise traders or Insiders, respectively)
with their mass divided by their risk-aversion parameter and call these CN;CO;CI. Let
C be the sum of these terms. For all purposes we consider, this market is equivalent to
one with homogeneous risk aversions equal to one and 1
C units of the asset. Since the
supply of the asset aects only the equilibrium risk premium, which we do not consider,
this is equivalent to varying the composition of the market, putting more weight on the
102
2). With all this in hand, we can proceed to solve the model. Imposing
market clearing and rearranging gives
 (
N
(2
1 + 2
2)
+
I
2
2
+
O
2
O
)+pr(
N
(2
1 + 2
2)
+
I
2
2
+
O
2
O
) 
O
2
O
E[11jp] =
N
(2
1 + 2
2)
S+
I
2
2
11:
(7)
We can solve the signal extraction problem to nd the expectation9 of
11 given p. It is given by
E[11jp] =
2
2
I
( I
2
21)2
( I
2
21)2 + ( N
(2
1+2
2)S)2  signal; (8)
where the signal is proportional to the dierence between the left-hand side
of (7) and its unconditional expectation. A complete derivation is given in
Appendix A. In equilibrium, the conditional expectation and variance are
given by
E[11jp] =
I
2
22
1
( I
2
21)2 + ( N
(2
1+2
2)S)2 + OI
2
O2
22
1
(pr(
N
(2
1 + 2
2)
+
I
2
2
+
O
2
O
) (
N
(2
1 + 2
2)
+
I
2
2
+
O
2
O
)+);
(9)

2
O = 
2
1
N22
S4
2
I22
1(2
1 + 2
2)2 + N22
S4
2
+ 
2
2: (10)
Plugging this back in to the market clearing equation and solving for the
price gives
p = r
 1(   A
 1) +
N
ABr(2
1 + 2
2)
S +
I
ABr2
2
11; (11)
where we have dened A and B as
A =
O
2
O
+
I
2
2
+
N
(2
1 + 2
2)
; (12)
less risk-averse participants. Changing the variance perceived by the Noise traders works
identically, because this variance enters their demand only multiplicatively with their risk
aversion.
9We show in Appendix A that there are situations in which the Outsiders may have
a higher expectation of fundamental value than either the Insiders or the Noise traders.
This is another sense in which markets can be considered unstable.
11B = 1  
OI
2
O2
22
1
( I
2
21)2 + ( N
(2
1+2
2)S)2 + OI
2
O2
22
1
: (13)
In (11), r 1 appears in each term because it is the riskless discount factor.
A is a factor describing the aggregate risk-bearing capacity of the market,
the inverse of which corresponds to the risk-premium agents demand in equi-
librium in the rst term.
The second term is the impact of the Noise trader sentiment shock on
the market price. The coecient here is
@p
@S and will be the subject of some
examination. The third is the impact of the aggregate information about
fundamental value on the price. If the market resembles the Noise trader-
free benchmark, the coecient on S should be close to zero and the coecient
on 1 should be close to 1r 1.
The ultimate objects of interest are how completely the fundamental in-
formation 1 and the sentiment S are incorporated into the prices of the asset.
We can write the impact of the fundamental information 1 and sentiment
shock S as
@p
@1
=
I1
ABr2
2
; (14)
@p
@S
=
N
ABr(2
1 + 2
2)
: (15)
It is dicult to evaluate these expressions analytically. In thoroughly
studied special cases, there are either only Insiders and Outsiders or only
Noise traders and Outsiders. In the former case, the coecient on 1 does
turn out to be 1r 1, while in the latter case the coecient on S decreases to-
wards zero as the risk-bearing capacity of the sophisticated traders increases.
These are signs of a stable market that prices assets eectively.
From these observations, the natural intuition to build would be that
adding more sophisticated investors, and in particular, adding more informed
sophisticated investors, pushes the coecient on S towards zero and decreases
the market volatility. Similarly, intuition might suggest that a small N nec-
essarily implies a small coecient on S, so Noise trader shocks do not get
factored into the price of the asset.
As we show in Section 5, neither of these intuitions holds for markets
in the Region of interest. The reason for this is that prices in this model
12are driven primarily by the trading behavior of the Outsiders, who have
most of the risk-bearing capacity and hence ability to move prices in this
model. Outsiders are trying to chase information, but may occasionally end
up chasing noise. Their eorts to chase information make them more aggres-
sive when they think there is more information in the market, which means
that adding Insiders to the market might destabilize prices. These eorts
to chase information also lead them to chase noise in some circumstances
by mistake, which might also have a destabilizing inuence. In the analysis
below, we seek to develop this logic.
To this end, we focus on evaluating
@p
@S in the Region of interest. In
Appendix B, we prove the following lemma:
Lemma 1.
@p
@S
= (
I
2
2
+
N
2
1 + 2
2
)
 1 N
r(2
1 + 2
2)
+(
I
2
2
+
N
2
1 + 2
2
)
 1r
 1OOutsiderDemandCurveSlope;
(16)
where the OutsiderDemandCurveSlope is dened as
@DO
@p . Lemma 1 makes
it clear that the slope of an Outsider's demand curve is crucial for stability
of nancial markets, as proxied for by
@p
@S. Our rst step, then, is to examine
this slope.
3. The slope of the outsider demand curve
In the cases of interest, Outsiders compose most of the market. As sug-
gested by Lemma 1, their demand curve and its slope in particular are then
important to understanding to see how the market behaves. The slope of an
Outsider's demand curve (after some rearrangement) is given by
dDO
dp
=
r

1
2
1
2
2I(1   N) +
N22
S
(2
1+2
2)
N
(2
1 + 2
2)
(
I
2
2

2
1  
N
(2
1 + 2
2)

2
S): (17)
We can understand the demand curve better by looking at its three multi-
plicands separately. The third term is the easiest to interpret, as it determines
the sign of the slope. Specically,
(
rI
2
2

2
1  
rN
(2
1 + 2
2)

2
S),
13Fig. 3: Outsider demand curve slope. The slope of the Outsider's demand
curve depends on the composition of the market and the relative standard
deviations of the signals S;1;2. These are S;1;2, respectively.
is the slope of the aggregate Insider demand curve times the variance of their
signal minus the slope of the aggregate Noise trader demand curve times the
variance of their \signal." If the Noise traders are \noisier" than the Insiders
are \inside," then the demand curve will be downward sloping.
The middle term
rN
(2
1 + 2
2)
,
is the slope of the aggregate Noise trader demand curve. When this slope is
small, the Noise trader demand is highly inelastic, so it is dicult to trade
14with them without changing the price signicantly. This makes it harder to
trade against Noise trader irrationality, a signicant source of equilibrium
prots for the Outsiders. Limited ability to make prots from the Noise
traders dampens the Outsider's willingness to trade, making his demand
curve less steep.
When this slope is large, the Outsiders can gain a lot by trading against
Noise traders. When this slope is small, the Noise traders make it hard to
trade against them so the Outsider's demand curve is less steep.
The rst term is harder to interpret:
1
r2
1
2
2I(1   N) +
rN22
S
(2
1+2
2)
.
The second term in the denominator is N times the slope of the aggregate
Noise trader demand curve times the variance of their shock. The rst term
is the slope of the aggregate Insider demand curve times the variance of their
shock, times I(1   N), which is a term describing the interaction between
the Insiders and the Outsiders trying to emulate them.
We would like to understand this demand curve in terms of three ef-
fects: the Outsiders trying to trade against the Noise traders, trying to avoid
adverse selection from better-informed Insiders, and trying to trade with
Insiders when they have a strong signal.
We interpret the middle term as being solely a matter of trading against
Noise traders. This makes sense, as this term does not involve the Insiders
and so cannot have anything to do with them.
The expression
I2
1
2
2 appears in the Outsider's demand curve both addi-
tively and multiplicatively. In the third term, it describes the portion of
information due to Insiders, which increases the Outsider's desire to trade
with Insiders, driving up the slope. We therefore interpret this term as a
following-Insiders or positive-feedback eect.
The expression also appears in the denominator of the rst term, and it
is large when Insiders are aggressive traders. The eect of a big term here
is to make the slope atter, regardless of its sign. When there is enough
information in the market for the curve to be upward sloping, a large
I2
1
2
2
makes it less upward sloping. When there is not enough information in the
market for the Outsiders to have an upward-sloping demand curve, this term
makes their demand curve less downward sloping. We interpret this term
15as the adverse selection term. Whenever Insiders are aggressive, it makes
Outsiders less aggressive because they are afraid of trading against Insiders.
We can directly evaluate the Outsider demand curve slope at N = 0 and
I = 0 to see how the Outsiders behave in the simple cases:
I = 0 )
dDO
dp
=  
r
(2
1 + 2
2)
; (18)
N = 0 )
dDO
dp
= 0: (19)
These are reassuring. With only Noise traders to trade against, the Out-
sider's demand is very elastic, since they know that trading against Noise
traders is optimal because prices contain no new information. With only
Insiders to trade with, the demand curve is perfectly inelastic because prices
are fully revealing and everyone behaves like an Insider (no-trade theorem
intuition applies). The separating case is easy to identify:
Lemma 2. The slope of the Outsider's demand curve is positive if and only
if I
2
22
1 > N
(2
1+2
2)2
S > 0.
Lemma 2 says the Outsider's demand curve is upward sloping if the ex-
pectation of the proportion of a price move due to Insiders is greater than
the proportion due to Noise traders. In particular, for every market with
a nonzero number of Insiders, there is a N > 0 such that the Outsider's
demand curve is positively sloping whenever 0 < N < N. Moreover, it can
be shown that for a xed positive number of Noise traders, more Insiders
always means a higher slope of the demand curve.
In the next section we consider the implications of this Outsider behavior
on market equilibrium.
4. Market equilibrium
We are interested in whether it is possible for
@p
@S to be large in the Region
of interest. We know that it is generally very small on the axes because the
sophisticated traders eectively trade against the Noise traders. The general
expression for
@p
@S is dicult to analyze in the interior of the domain, so we
take three alternative approaches.
16First, we analyze the special cases that we do understand well: markets
with either no Noise traders or no Insiders. By understanding these markets
thoroughly, we can gain insights into the behavior of markets with similar
compositions.
Second, we perform local experiments: we ask how
@p
@S changes as we move
innitesimally away from one of our well-understood cases. The market with
no Insiders has a very small
@p
@S, as does the market with no Noise traders.
We ask how
@p
@S changes when we add the marginal Insider or Noise trader.
These two experiments are depicted in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4: Changing the market composition. We consider what happens locally
as we move from markets with no Noise traders (Insiders) to markets with
very few Noise traders (Insiders).
The nal approach is numerical. We calculate
@p
@S for a range of parameter
values and across the Region of interest to establish that
@p
@S can in fact achieve
17a maximum near the origin.
4.1. The cases of the missing types
To gain more insight into the market equilibrium, we evaluate the com-
parative statics of price in the cases in which either Noise traders, Insider
traders, or uninformed sophisticated traders are missing. First, suppose Noise
traders are absent. When N = 0, note that 2
O = 2
2, so the expressions for
the impact of information and sentiment on price become
@p
@1
=
1
r
; (20)
@p
@S
= 0: (21)
This is intuitive. With no noise coming from the Noise traders, the un-
informed investors can perfectly back out the signal 1, so they behave as if
they are informed. Now, setting I = 0 to get rid of the Insider traders and
noting that this implies 2
O = 2
1 + 2
2 , the comparative statics become
@p
@1
= 0; (22)
@p
@S
=
N
r
: (23)
Again this is an intuitively appealing result. The Outsiders know that
any price movement is due to Noise traders so choose to trade against it, but
their ability to do so is limited by their risk-bearing capacity. Their collective
risk-bearing capacity depends on their mass O, which is pinned down here
to be 1   N. Thus, the O + N term disappears from the denominator.
Finally, we can look at the situation with only Insiders and Noise traders,
so O = 0:
@p
@1
=
I1
r2
2
(
I
2
2
+
N
(2
1 + 2
2)
)
 1; (24)
@p
@S
=
N
r(2
1 + 2
2)
(
I
2
2
+
N
(2
1 + 2
2)
)
 1: (25)
18The intuition for these results is exactly as above. These results make
clear that the model we present subsumes as a special case the previously
studied models. Each of the three possible pairings has been studied sepa-
rately, and we are looking at what happens when all three types are present.
4.2. The rst noise trader
When there are no Noise traders in the market, we know
@p
@S is zero. The
main contention of this paper is that markets with very small numbers of
Noise traders need not behave qualitatively like markets with none at all.
To quantify this claim, we can look at the dierence in
@p
@S when we go
from N = 0 to N > 0. To keep the size of the market constant, we perform
this experiment holding the number of Insiders constant and changing an
Outsider into a Noise trader. That is, dO =  dN. This is a comparison
of the equilibrium behavior of two dierent but similarly composed markets.
The strongest possible proof of our claim would be a discontinuous jump.
This does not occur, but the next strongest proof would be a very high
derivative at 0. In Appendix B we prove that this is exactly what we see:
Proposition 1.
@2p
@S@NjN=0 =
2
2
Ir(2
1+2
2) . In particular,
@2p
@S@NjN=0 becomes
arbitrarily large for small I.
Since we generally think of the Insiders as being a small population, this
proposition focuses on the most relevant part of the domain. In this region,
the rst marginal Noise trader can have an enormous impact on market
equilibrium despite being innitesimally small himself.
The driving force behind this result is the positive slope of the Outsider's
demand curve.10 At N = 0 the Outsider's demand curve is at. By Lemma 2,
adding a suciently small number of Noise traders will make the Outsider's
demand curve strictly upward sloping. With an upward-sloping demand
curve, the Outsiders will trade with any price movement they observe. When
the Noise trader does start trading, the Outsiders chase him trading very
aggressively, mistaking it for an Insider trade. This causes the sentiment S
10In general, changing the composition of the market will also aect the Outsider's
demand curve slope by changing 2
O in the denominator. In Appendix B we show that
this is irrelevant for this particular experiment because
@
2
O
@N jN=0 =
@
2
O
@I jI=0 = 0. Starting
from the boundary, the rst Noise trader or Insider has no rst-order eect on the variance
perceived by the Outsider.
19to be factored into the price much more strongly than it would if only the
Noise trader were trading on it.
Subsequent Noise traders do not have nearly as big an eect because the
Outsider's demand curve attens and eventually becomes downward sloping
as more and more Noise traders join the market. Nevertheless, this proposi-
tion captures the fact that it does not take many Noise traders to get a noisy
market.
This big eect only comes into play because the Outsider's demand curve
is upward sloping at N  0. This highlights the centrality of the presence of
Insiders. Without them, this slope would not be positive and the eects of
noise would not be nearly so pronounced. This suggests that there may be
circumstances in which adding Insiders can destabilize the market. We show
exactly that in the next section.
4.3. Destabilizing Insiders
In a market with only Noise traders and Outsiders, the Outsiders know
any price movement to be caused by the Noise traders, so they trade against
any price movements they observe. Their demand curves are strongly down-
ward sloping. Outsiders' willingness to keep the Noise traders from aecting
market prices is limited only by their risk-bearing capacity. What happens
when we start adding Insiders? In a perfect world, two nice things would
happen. First, the Insiders' information would be factored into the price per-
fectly. Second, the Insiders, who have a lower perceived variance and thus a
higher risk-bearing capacity, would eectively trade against any Noise trader
shocks.
To examine this, we look at how
@p
@S changes when we add dI Insiders.
Holding the number of Noise traders constant so that dI =  dO, the exper-
iment we are considering is turning an Outsider into an Insider.
The derivative is hard to evaluate in general analytically, but can be
signed locally near I = 0 because of the fact that
@2
O
@I jI=0 = 0. In Appendix
B we prove the following proposition
Proposition 2. For suciently small levels of 2
S, N, and I, increasing the
number of Insiders while decreasing the number of Outsiders increases price
instability, i.e.,
@2p
@S@I > 0.
Instead of decreasing the impact of Noise traders, adding an Insider in-
creases it. This eect holds in particular in the Region of interest near
20the origin, where there are many Outsiders. The intuition for this result is
twofold. First, when Insiders join the market, the Informativeness of prices
to the Outsiders goes up quickly. In particular, if 1 is large compared to S
and the Insiders are more inside than the Noise traders are noisy, the slope
of the Outsider's demand curve quickly shifts upward. The rst marginal
Insider is not enough to make the demand curve slope up, but as the curve
shifts towards atness, the Outsiders stop trading against the Noise traders,
so the Noise traders have a greater impact. This eect is magnied by the
fact that in the Region of interest there are many Outsiders all trading with
the same strategy.
Second, after enough Insiders have been added to the market, the Out-
sider demand curve becomes upward sloping. Once this happens, they start
actively trading with any price movement they see. Since they cannot dis-
tinguish between price movements caused by Insiders and Outsiders, they
occasionally trade with the Noise traders. Again, since there are many of
them, on these occasions the market behaves like there is a large mass of
Noise traders.
Proposition 2 shows that in a neighborhood of I = 0,
@p
@S is increasing in
I, but does not tell us anything globally. We can numerically calculate these
derivatives for a range of parameter values.
Table 1
@p
@S;1 = 0:1;S = 0:1;2 = 1
Price sensitivity to noise
@p
@S. The equilibrium
sensitivity of the asset's price to noise shocks S depends on the
composition of the market and the relative standard deviations
of the signals S;1;2. These are S;1;2, respectively.
I = N = 0 .01 .05 .1 .2
0 0 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.2
0.01 0 0.4999 0.2324 0.189 0.2398
0.05 0 0.189 0.4997 0.4417 0.3778
0.1 0 0.0972 0.3876 0.4995 0.4811
0.2 0 0.0489 0.2245 0.3777 0.4990
21Fig. 5: Sensitivity of price to noise
@p
@S. The equilibrium sensitivity of the
asset's price to noise shocks S depends on the composition of the market and
the relative standard deviations of the signals S;1;2. These are S;1;2,
respectively.
The gures make clear that the eects described are strongest when the
Noise traders are not very noisy. When the average quality of Insider in-
formation 1 is high compared to the average size of the sentiment shock
S, the odds that any price movement is due to noise trading is low, so it
is optimal most of the time for the Outsider to trade with the price move-
ment. In these situations, large sentiment shocks do not happen often, but
even moderate shocks can become enormously magnied, even more so than
in markets with only Noise traders. In these markets, the sensitivity of the
price to the sentiment shock S can far exceed both N and 1, as shown in
the lower left-hand corner of Fig. 5 and in Table 2. In particular, the gure
shows that
@p
@S becomes large in markets with \quiet" Noise traders (S = 0:1)
22Table 2
@p
@S;1 = 1;S = :1;2 = 1
Price sensitivity to noise
@p
@S. The equilibrium
sensitivity of the asset's price to noise shocks S depends on the
composition of the market and the relative standard deviations
of the signals S;1;2. These are S;1;2, respectively.
I = N = 0 .01 .05 .1 .2
0 0 .01 0.05 .1 .2
0.01 0 0.4963 2.2908 3.763 4.2932
0.05 0 0.0995 0.486 0.9381 1.707
0.1 0 0.0497 0.2435 0.4726 0.8804
0.2 0 0.0249 0.1218 0.2367 0.4435
Table 3
@p
@S;1 = :1;2 = 1;S = 1
Price sensitivity to noise
@p
@S. The equilibrium
sensitivity of the asset's price to noise shocks S depends on the
composition of the market and the relative standard deviations
of the signals S;1;2. These are S;1;2, respectively.
I = N = 0 .01 .05 .1 .2
0 0 .01 0.05 .1 .2
0.01 0 0.0198 0.0519 0.1009 0.2004
0.05 0 0.0478 0.059 0.1042 0.2018
0.1 0 0.0544 0.0664 0.1079 0.2033
0.2 0 0.0413 0.0759 0.1133 0.2056
and well-informed Insiders (1 = 1). This illustrates the central point of the
paper: in these types of markets, it is rational for Outsiders to interpret any
movements they see as based on information, and so trade with them. The
mass of Outsider trades makes the eect
@p
@S very large.
Quantitatively, we want to focus on the magnitudes displayed in the lower
left-hand panel of Fig. 5 and Table 2. Analytically, we have examined
@2p
@S@I
and
@2p
@S@N, but it is the level of
@p
@S that is of fundamental interest. Among the
parameter values considered, the maximum value of 4.3641 for
@p
@S is achieved
23Table 4
@p
@S;1 = 1;2 = 1;S = 1
Price sensitivity to noise
@p
@S. The equilibrium
sensitivity of the asset's price to noise shocks S depends on the
composition of the market and the relative standard deviations
of the signals S;1;2. These are S;1;2, respectively.
I = N = 0 .01 .05 .1 .2
0 0 .01 0.05 .1 .2
0.01 0 0.3988 0.3688 0.2672 0.2748
0.05 0 0.0986 0.3939 0.5 0.4706
0.1 0 0.0496 0.2305 0.3878 0.5
0.2 0 0.0249 0.1203 0.2256 0.375
with 17% Noise traders and 1% Insiders in the market, in the market with
1 = 1;S = :1. This greatly exceeds the value of 1 that would obtain if only
Noise traders participated in the market and 0.17 if there were no Insiders
in the market. In the case with small masses of each type, the interaction of
Noise traders and Insiders causes the Outsiders to occasionally chase noise
aggressively, so that noise shocks are greatly amplied. Because S is small,
the market generally behaves well, but occasionally the price of the asset
diverges sharply from fundamental value.
In this sense, the question is one of ex-ante or ex-post stability. Ex ante,
the additional Insiders make the Price system more informative (shown in
section 5.2) and more stable most of the time. Ex post and for specic realiza-
tions of S, the additional Insiders increase
@p
@S and so increase the sensitivity
of the price to these shocks. This is a measure of ex-post instability.
It is tempting to make normative judgements about the eects of Insiders
based on this destabilizing eect, but to do so would be premature. Adding
Insiders does increase the eect of the Noise trader sentiment, increasing
market volatility at time 1, but it also leads to fundamental information
being factored into the price more eectively, leading to less volatility at
time 2. Fig. 6 below shows the eect of the fundamental shock 1 on the
period-1 price for dierent market congurations and parameter values. In
all cases, more Insiders moves the market toward more fully pricing their
fundamental information. In this respect, they are stabilizing the market.
24Recall that the cases in which Insiders are destabilizing are those in which
S is small compared to 1 and the composition of the market lies in the
Region of interest. These are exactly the markets where Noise traders are
generally very quiet. Most of the time, Noise traders get only a small shock,
Insider information gets factored into the price eectively, and the market
behaves well. It is only on a rare occasion (like the spring of 2007, we argue)
that the Noise traders get a moderate or big shock and the market behaves
ineciently because the rational Outsiders trade along with the noise.
Fig. 6: Sensitivity of price to information:
@p
@1. The equilibrium sensitivity of
the asset's price to information shocks 1 depends on the composition of the
market and the relative standard deviations of the signals S;1;2. These
are S;1;2, respectively.
254.4. Demand covariance
We would like to think that most of the time, Outsiders successfully
trade with the Insiders. The result of the previous section showed that when
they fail to do so, they can fail rather dramatically. Here we show that, on
average, they do indeed trade together. A reasonable way to measure whether
Outsiders and Insiders trade together is the covariance of their demands. In
Appendix B we prove the following proposition
Proposition 3. The Outsiders, on average, trade with the Insiders. Specif-
ically, Cov(DI;DO)  0.
This is extremely intuitive. If the Outsiders are rational, they must be
doing their best to emulate the Insiders. If their demands did not positively
covary, it would be protable for the Outsiders to ip the slope of their
demand curves.
Outsiders earn rational risk premia just for holding the asset, a term we do
not focus on. Proposition 3 implies that they also make money, on average,
by trading with the Insiders and against the Noise traders. Noise traders
systematically lose money since they always trade against the information
contained in 1. Their losses are mitigated only in those states when S and
2 have the same sign. Since the two shocks are uncorrelated, this occurs
only half the time, and only rarely will be large enough to oset their losses
due to trading against the Insiders.
How can Proposition 3 and Propositions 1, 2 be true at the same time?
Most of the time the Outsiders trade with the Insiders (this is Proposition
3). They do not, however, trade on the same side of the market 100% of the
time. On rare occasions (for the parameter values we are interested in), the
Noise traders get a modestly big shock. Because of the signal extraction
at the heart of the model, the Outsiders believe that this is most likely an
Insider shock, so trade with the Noise traders. This means that the eect of
a moderate Noise trader shock is big (Propositions 1, 2), but only rarely is
there a big enough Noise trader shock to cause the Outsiders to trade against
the Insiders.
Proposition 2 is a statement about
@p
@S and how it changes as we vary
the number of Insiders in the market. Now, we expect this derivative to be
non-negative regardless of the composition of the market, because a slight
increase in S shifts up the Noise trader's demand curve while leaving everyone
else's unaected.
26Fundamentally, Propositions 3 and 1, 2 are about dierent things. Propo-
sition 3 is for each xed set of parameter values (specically, the makeup of
the market). Propositions 1 and 2 are answering questions about two simul-
taneous experiments: how much bigger would the price have been if S had
been higher by dS? With that question answered, how much bigger would
the answer to that question be if I were higher by dI?
5. Other measures of market stability and ef-
ciency
5.1. Good variance, bad variance
Another metric to measure the impact Noise traders have on market
eciency is the variance of the equilibrium asset price. That variance can be
written as

2
p = (
@p
@S
)
2
2
S + (
@p
@1
)
2: (26)
This variance naturally splits into two pieces: variance caused by sen-
timent shocks, and variance caused by Insider information being factored
into the price. The latter is \good variance," as it reduces volatility between
times 1 and 2. The remaining \bad variance" can be looked at as the variance
perceived by the Insider:
var(pj1) = (
@p
@S
)
2
2
S: (27)
From this equation, it is clear that analyzing var(pj1) is nearly equivalent
to analyzing
@p
@S. Holding S constant and varying other parameters, increases
in
@p
@S map one-to-one into increases in var(pj1). As S converges to zero,
@p
@S gets large, but that eect is oset by the decrease in S. In Appendix C
we show that the limit of var(pj1) as S converges to zero is zero, and that
the convergence is asymptotically linear. This tempers the strength of some
of our results, but leaves unchanged the conclusions about how the market
behavior varies as we vary the market composition.
We would like to think that in a market composed of sophisticated in-
vestors, adding Insiders would be stabilizing and would decrease the variance
of the price. Proposition 1 showed that
@p
@S can increase, so it comes as no
27surprise that the variance of price can also be increased by the addition of
Insiders. In Appendix B we prove the following proposition
Proposition 4. For suciently small N and I, changing a marginal Out-
sider into an Insider increases both the variance of the price and the \bad
variance."
The set of parameters for which the variance increases is identical to the
set for which
@p
@S increases in Proposition 4.
By this metric as well, adding Insiders to a market is destabilizing. The
interaction between Insiders and Outsiders in the presence of Noise traders
causes the Noise trader shock to be integrated into the price more strongly,
increasing the \bad variance." It also has the eect of increasing the sensitiv-
ity of the price to the Insider's information, increasing the \good variance."
Naturally, this leads to the question of which eect is stronger. A natural
way to compare the strength of these two eects is the Informativeness of
the price system, which we consider next.
Fig. 7 shows the standard deviation of the price across dierent market
compositions for various parameter values. In particular, it shows that with
\quiet" Noise traders (S small), the market can be more volatile with small
numbers of Noise traders than with more of them. With more Noise traders,
each Outsider's demand curve becomes downward sloping, so Outsiders par-
tially oset the variance caused by Noise traders.
5.2. Informativeness of the price system
Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) dene the \Informativeness of the price
system" to be (corr(p;1))2. This is a ratio of information-to-noise in prices
and gives a measure of how well markets perform their function of reecting
information known to agents. The Informativeness in this case can be written
as
(
@p
@1)2
2
p
=
1
N2
I2
4
22
S
(2
1+2
2)2 + 1
: (28)
From this expression two important propositions immediately follow:
Proposition 5. Adding Insiders always weakly increases the Informativeness
of the price system.
28Fig. 7: Standard deviation of p. The equilibrium standard deviation of the
asset's price in period two depends on the composition of the market and
the relative standard deviations of the signals S;1;2. These are S;1;2,
respectively.
Proposition 6. Adding Noise traders always decreases the Informativeness
of the price system. This eect becomes unboundedly large as I and N ap-
proach zero.
Any increase in the number of Insiders increases the Informativeness of
the price system. This can be seen as the combination of two eects. First,
chasing behavior by the Outsiders causes the \bad variance" to increase,
which would tend to dampen the Informativeness of the price system. At
the same time, this chasing behavior is applied to any information that the
Insiders have. The Outsiders chase the Insiders, and the \good variance"
increases. Proposition 5 says that the good variance increases by more than
the bad variance.
29Proposition 6 considers an alternative experiment of adding Noise traders
(while removing Outsiders). It is no surprise that additional Noise traders
decrease the Informativeness of the price, but it is by no means obvious that
the eect can become unboundedly large as I goes to zero.
We have analyzed three ways of measuring the stability and eciency of
the market, with an eye towards seeing whether a small number of Noise
traders can have an eect. The principal conclusion is that the presence of
Noise traders can in fact have a large inuence on the market equilibrium. Ex
ante, small numbers of Noise traders do little to diminish the Informativeness
of the price system, but can hugely increase the variance of the price in period
1. The result we focus more on is the surprising one: ex post, markets with a
small number of Noise traders can have large sensitivities to the Noise trader
shock,
@p
@S. This, perhaps, can explain the evidence in Fig. 1.
5.3. Why
@p
@S is important
Given that there is at least one metric which cleanly identies the e-
ciency of the market, why bother with any other metrics, in particular,
@p
@S?
The model is stylized and eectively static, but if we think of it as repeating
itself, the time series behavior will be best described by the variance and
Informativeness results. It is only when trying to understand specic market
realizations that
@p
@S is important.
The ex-ante metrics show us that, on average, the Noise traders may have
a fairly small eect in the Region of interest. It is no surprise that the price
reacts to the Noise trader shock. What is surprising is that the sensitivity
of the price to the Noise trader shock is not monotonically decreasing in the
number of Insiders. In order to understand particular instances of sophisti-
cated markets going awry, it is important to keep in mind that
@p
@S is liable to
be big exactly in the markets in which we think Noise traders are quietest.
6. Conclusion
We presented a simple model in which rational but uninformed traders oc-
casionally chase noise as if it were information, thereby amplifying sentiment
shocks and moving price away from fundamental values. The model oers a
potential explanation for the surprisingly low market price of nancial risk
in the spring of 2007.
30We ll a gap in the theoretical literature by showing conditions under
which Noise traders can have an impact on market equilibrium dispropor-
tionate to their size in the market. Explaining market outcomes by calling
on large numbers of Noise traders or large sentiment shocks is not always
plausible, but we show that neither of these is necessary in order for Noise
traders to be relevant.
Our model is thus most suitable for modeling markets largely populated
by sophisticated investors. It might help explain how sophisticated investors
end up chasing noise in other situations of quiet before the storm, such as the
period prior to the 1998 Russian crisis that bankrupted Long Term Capital
Management. It is not good for shedding light on markets that might be
dominated by noise traders, such as the Internet stocks.
A key feature of the model is the way in which sophisticated but unin-
formed investors learn from prices. Of course, such investors may entertain
more complex models and use other public information, such as bond rat-
ings, in forming their demands. This may lead to similar phenomena. If
ratings agencies usually do a good job of assessing the riskiness of bond of-
ferings, it may be rational for uninformed traders to use these ratings as
a rule-of-thumb to assess underlying value. On those occasions when the
ratings agencies are wrong, this will induce correlated mistakes among the
mass of uninformed traders, which will overwhelm the price impact of any
better-informed traders in the market. Only when the direct news about
valuations reaches the uninformed investors would the market correct itself.
In this example, uninformed traders end up rationally chasing noise thinking
that it reects information.
A. Derivation of conditional expectation and
variance
We begin by deriving the demand curves directly from utility maximiza-
tion. Let p be the price of the asset. The value is as above. Agent i begins
with wealth Wi and chooses demand Di to maximize
Ei[ e (DiV +(Wi Dip)r)].
Maximizing this expression is equivalent to minimizing minus this expres-
sion, which is in turn equivalent to minimizing the log of that. Assuming for
31the moment that V is normally distributed conditional on agent i's informa-
tion set, then we are trying to minimize
 Ei[(DiV + (Wi   Dip)r)] +
2
2 D2
i2
i(V ),
where Ei denotes the expectation with respect to agent i's information set
and 2
i(V ) denotes the variance of V conditional on agent i's information set.
The rst-order condition in Di is
0 =  Ei[V ] + pr + 2Di2
i(V )
) Di =
Ei[V ]   pr
2
i(V )
.
For the Insider, this becomes
Di =
 + 11   pr
2
2
: (29)
For the Outsider, this becomes
Di =
 + E[11jp]   pr
2
O
; (30)
where E[11jp] and 2
O are endogenous. 2
O is given by
2
O = V ar(11jp) + 2
2.
Finally, the demand for the Noise traders is given by
Di =
 + S   pr
2
N
; (31)
where 2
N is the variance perceived by the Noise traders. Since the Noise
traders do not observe a signal or use the price to update their information
set, their perceived variance is the same as the ex-ante variance 2
N = (2
1 +
2
2). With all this in hand, we can proceed to solve the model. Imposing
market clearing gives
1 = N
+S pr
(2
1+2
2) + I
+11 pr
2
2 + O
+E[11jp] pr
2
O
32)  (
N
(2
1 + 2
2)
+
I
2
2
+
O
2
O
)+pr(
N
(2
1 + 2
2)
+
I
2
2
+
O
2
O
) 
O
2
O
E[11jp] =
N
(2
1 + 2
2)
S+
I
2
2
11:
(32)
This is Eq. (7) in the text. We can solve the signal extraction problem
here to nd the expectation of 1 given p. It is given by
E[
I
2
2
11jp] =
( I
2
21)2
( I
2
21)2 + ( N
(2
1+2
2)S)2  signal; (33)
where the signal is the dierence between the left-hand side of (7) and its
unconditional expectation. That dierence is (using the law of iterated ex-
pectations to eliminate the unconditional expectation of 1)
pr( N
(2
1+2
2)+ I
2
2 + O
2
O)  O
2
OE[11jp] E[pr( N
(2
1+2
2)+ I
2
2 + O
2
O)  O
2
OE[11jp]]
= pr( N
(2
1+2
2) + I
2
2 + O
2
O)   O
2
OE[11jp]   E[pr( N
(2
1+2
2) + I
2
2 + O
2
O)].
We can nd the unconditional expectation of p by taking expectations of
(7):
) E[p] =
( N
(2
1+2
2)+ I
2
2
+ O
2
O
) 
r( N
(2
1+2
2)+ I
2
2
+ O
2
O
) .
Plugging this in to the expression for the signal gives
pr( N
(2
1+2
2) + I
2
2 + O
2
O)   O
2
OE[11jp]   ( N
(2
1+2
2) + I
2
2 + O
2
O) + .
So we can nally solve for the conditional expectation of 1:
) E[11jp] =
I
2
2
2
1
( I
2
2
1)2+( N
(2
1+2
2)S)2+ OI
2
O2
2
2
1
(pr( N
(2
1+2
2)+ I
2
2+ O
2
O) ( N
(2
1+2
2)+
I
2
2 + O
2
O) + ).
33We can now solve for the price by plugging this in to the market clearing
condition:
) pr( O
2
O + I
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(2
1+2
2))(1 
OI
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O2
2
2
1
( I
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2
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1+2
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2
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1
) = (( N
(2
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2
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1
( I
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2
1)2+( N
(2
1+2
2)S)2+ OI
2
O2
2
2
1
) + N
(2
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2)S + I
2
211.
We cannot really rewrite this any more cleanly, but can dene A and B
by
A =
O
2
O
+
I
2
2
+
N
(2
1 + 2
2)
; (34)
B = 1  
OI
2
O2
22
1
( I
2
21)2 + ( N
(2
1+2
2)S)2 + OI
2
O2
22
1
; (35)
so that we can solve for p as
p = r
 1(   A
 1) +
N
ABr(2
1 + 2
2)
S +
I
ABr2
2
11: (36)
We are not yet done solving the signal extraction problem because we still
need to solve for the conditional variance 2
O. We do that now. Recalling
again Eq. (7):
 ( N
(2
1+2
2)+ I
2
2 + O
2
O)+pr( N
(2
1+2
2)+ I
2
2 + O
2
O)  O
2
OE[11jp] = N
(2
1+2
2)S+
I
2
211.
The Outsider observes the price and in equilibrium knows his own con-
ditional expectation, so knows the left-hand side of this equation. Thus, he
knows the right-hand side, so we can nd the conditional variance of I
2
211
given the sum on the right-hand side.
V ar( I
2
211jp) =
I22
1
4
2   (
I22
1
4
2 )2 1
I22
1
4
2
+
N22
S
(2
1+2
2)2
34) V ar(11jp) = 2
1   2
1
I22
1
4
2
I22
1
4
2
+
N22
S
(2
1+2
2)2
= 2
1
N22
S4
2
I22
1(2
1+2
2)2+N22
S4
2.
So we can calculate 2
O

2
O = 
2
1
N22
S4
2
I22
1(2
1 + 2
2)2 + N22
S4
2
+ 
2
2: (37)
This completely describes the equilibrium.
A.1. Outsider demand curve slope
Plugging the conditional mean and variance into the expression for the
Outsider's demand curve gives
+E[11jp] pr
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This is the expression used in the text.
A.2. Equilibrium conditional expectation
The Outsider's conditional expectation of V in equilibrium is given by
E[V jp] =  +
(1 B)2
O
O  (prA   A + 1)
35= +
(1 B)2
O
O 

(r 1(   A 1) + N
ABr(2
1+2
2)S + I
ABr2
211)rA   A + 1

=  +
(1 B)
B
2
O
O

N
(2
1+2
2)S + I
2
211

.
As usual, we have to evaluate this expression numerically, and we nd
that with the parameterizations considered in the paper, the coecient on
1 can get as high as 1.9, while the slope on S can get as high as 5.8. When
either of these slopes exceeds 1, for suciently large realizations of the shocks,
the Outsiders may have expectations for the value of the asset which exceed
those of either the Insiders or the Noise traders.
B. Proofs of propositions
B.1.
@p
@S
B.1.1.
@2p
@S@I
First, we start with the derivative of 2
O:
@2
O
@I = @
@I(2
1
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S4
2
I22
1(2
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2) 2.
Note that this is zero at I = 0. Next, we look at the derivatives of A and
B.
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At I = 0, this becomes
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Moving on to B:
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This is ugly to evaluate in general, but we can evaluate it at I = 0:
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Finally, we can take a derivative of
@p
@S with respect to I:
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Again, hard to evaluate, but at I = 0, this becomes
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When I = 0, A and B become:
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37B = 1.
So, we can nally plug in to get
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Proposition 2 can then be read directly o of this expression.
B.1.2.
@2p
@S@N
We can do a similar analysis turning an Outsider into a Noise trader,
starting from zero Noise traders. If
@2p
@S@NjN=0 is large and positive, this shows
that markets with almost no noise need not behave almost like markets with
no noise. In order, analyzing the derivatives of 2
O, A, and B at N = 0 gives
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So, we can solve for the desired comparative static:
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This can be arbitrarily big if I is close to zero. This shows Proposition 1.
B.2. Variance of p
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As above, we consider changing dI Outsiders into Insiders.
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We evaluate this at I = 0
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39The derivative here is the same as
@2p
@S@I from above when evaluated at
I = 0. We then get
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We are primarily interested in cases when O is big and N is small. Again,
the truth of the proposition can be read directly o of this last expression.
B.3. Demand covariance
Cov(DI;DO) = Cov(
+11 pr
2
2 ;
+E[11jp] pr
2
O )
= 1
22
22
OCov(11   pr;E[11jp]   pr).
Ignoring the constant term, we can write
Cov(11   pr;E[11jp]   pr) = Cov(11   pr;E[11   prjp]).
The second term in this covariance is the conditional expectation of the
rst term, that is, the function F(p) that satises
E[11   pr   F(p)] = 0,
and minimizes
E[(11   pr   F(p))2],
over all functions F(p) which satisfy the rst condition. We can write the
second-moment criterion as
40E[(11   pr)2] + E[F(p)2]   2E[(11   pr)F(p)]
= E[(11 pr)2]+E[F(p)2] 2Cov(11 pr;F(p)) 2E[11 pr]E[F(p)].
From the rst criterion, E[F(p)] = E[11   pr], so this becomes
= E[(11   pr)2]   2E[11   pr]2 + E[F(p)2]   2Cov(11   pr;F(p)).
Suppose for the moment that the covariance we care about is negative.
Then we are subtracting two of that covariance in this expression, or adding
a positive term. Replacing F(p) with E[F(p)] will then decrease the E[F(p)2]
term (by Jensen's Inequality) and turn the covariance to zero, thus decreasing
the second moment we are trying to minimize. It follows that the covariance
is non-negative, as desired. We have the desired proposition.
C. Tying
@p
@S to the slope of the Outsider de-
mand curve
Write the Outsider demand curve as DO = mp + b. The market clearing
condition becomes
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Taking a derivative in S gives
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OSlope: (38)
C.1.
@p
@SS
We have shown that
@p
@S gets large as S gets small. We consider the
product of these two terms
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Moreover, this convergence is asymptotically linear.
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